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THE CASE FOR TIPPING AND UNRESTRICTED 
TIP-POOLING: PROMOTING INTRAFIRM 
COOPERATION 
SAMUEL ESTREICHER* 
JONATHAN REMY NASH** 
Abstract: No law in the United States requires or prohibits customers from tip-
ping employees for satisfactory service. Tip income is typically regarded as be-
longing to employees and may not be appropriated by the employer. Tipping is a 
widespread phenomenon in certain settingsrestaurants, hotels, and gambling 
casinos. It is a form of performance-based variable compensation that is general-
ly not found elsewhere in this country, where employees generally prefer fixed 
incomes over a defined period. As a general matter, our laws allow tipping but 
regulate the sharing of tip income among employees. In the restaurant setting, 
tip-pooling occurs when tips received by one employee are shared to some extent 
with other employees. For example, waitstaff at a restaurant might pool tips only 
with other waiters; this is legally permitted. A broader arrangement, that is pres-
ently not allowed, would be an employer policy providing for the sharing of tips 
beyond the waitstaff to include those who bus the tables or work in the kitchen. 
The U.S. tipping norm is under challenge. A growing number of restaurant own-
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 We discuss in this Article (1) the relative merits of an employer policy allowing and encouraging 
customers to tip employees for satisfactory service as contrasted with an employer policy dissuading 
such tipping, and (2) the relative merits of a policy barring the sharing of tips with non-server em-
ployees as opposed to a policy allowing such tip-pooling. We leave for another day other important 
questions concerning tipping, such as whether there should be a subminimum wage for “tipped” em-
ployees, and, if so, whether that wage floor should be raised in light of increases in the cost of living 
or minimum wages. See SYLVIA A. ALLEGRETTO & DAVID COOPER, ECON. POL’Y INST., TWENTY-
THREE YEARS AND STILL WAITING FOR CHANGE: WHY IT’S TIME TO GIVE TIPPED WORKERS THE 
REGULAR MINIMUM WAGE 18 (2014); NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL ET AL., THE IMPACT OF RAISING THE 
MINIMUM WAGE ON WOMEN: AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING A ROBUST TIPPED MINIMUM 
WAGE 5 & nn.8–9 (2014). We also do not address state and local government laws that may require 
employers to treat tip income as belonging to employees even where tipped employees are paid the 
full statutory minimum wage. Cf. Marlow v. New Food Guy, Inc., 861 F.3d 1157, 1159 (10th Cir. 
2017) (“If an employer pays more than the minimum wage without regard to tips, the FLSA does not 
restrict the employer’s use of tips.”). 
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ers in big cities are moving to ban tipping and instead raise prices. They argue 
that existing law precludes them from sharing tips with back-of-the-house em-
ployees (like chefs and dishwashers), and thus makes it hard to compensate those 
employees fairly for their contribution to the joint endeavor. We argue that the 
movement against tipping is ill-advised. Voluntary tipping is a valuable social in-
stitution that allows customers to monitor service where management cannot 
readily do so. The better answer to a flat-out tipping ban is to remove legal re-
strictions on tip-pooling. Pooling tips among a broad swath of employees (other 
than ownership-level employees) helps promote the cooperative endeavor under-
lying the provision of service in settings like restaurants. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imported from Europe, tipping grew in popularity across the United States 
in the first century, and by the early 1900s it was fairly well-established in res-
taurants, hotels, and railroads.1 The first half of the twentieth century witnessed 
growing discomfort with the practice, extending even to the organization of an 
“Anti-Tipping Society of America.”2 Some establishments actively discouraged 
tipping.3 The anti-tipping movement eventually lost momentum, and tipping 
became fairly entrenched in American life and culture, at least in restaurants and 
hotels in big cities, and the gaming industry.4 
Recently, opposition to tipping has re-emerged. A growing number of res-
taurateurs have announced their intention to eliminate tipping.5 It is not always 
clear what these restaurateurs are, in fact, planning to do. Some may pay all 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See KERRY SEGRAVE, TIPPING: AN AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY OF GRATUITIES 1–7 (1998). 
Tipping has also become a significant practice for taxicab service, in hair and nail salons, and in the 
gaming industry. See generally Kandis McClure, Tip-Pooling at Nevada Casinos, 5 UNLV GAMING 
L.J. 81 (2014) (describing tipping practices in the gaming industry). 
 2 SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 28–29. Members of the Anti-Tipping Society of America were re-
quired not to give a tip to anyone for twelve months, “and to meet possible resultant embarrassment 
each member is supplied with membership cards which he hands over to such neighbors as may be 
about him and endeavors to enlist them in the organization.” Id. Commercial travelers and business-
men were the principal members of this group, which claimed to have a membership of 100,000 by 
1905. Id. 
 3 See id. at 16–17 (noting that the New York Central Railroad actively sought to discourage cus-
tomers from tipping redcaps, on the ground that the company paid the redcaps directly); THE PETRI-
FIED FOREST (Warner Bros. 1936) (featuring a diner scene with the sign “Tipping Is Un-American 
Keep Your Change” prominently hanging behind the counter). 
 4 See SEGRAVE, supra note 1, at 59 (noting that from 1920 to 1949 hotels and restaurants that did 
not allow tips “continued to exist, but in very small numbers”). 
 5 Michael Lynn, Should U.S. Restaurants Abandon Tipping? A Review of the Issues and Evi-
dence, 5 PSYCHOSOC. ISSUES HUM. RES. MGMT. 120, 121 (2016). A 2015 listing includes the Union 
Square Hospitality Group, and Dirt Candy in New York City; Bar Marco in Pittsburgh; the Radler in 
Chicago; Coi and Manos Nouveau in San Francisco; The Walrus and the Carpenter, and Ivar’s Sea-
food in Seattle; and Victory 44 and Upton 43 in Minneapolis. Id. One prominent chain abandoned the 
experiment in 2016. See Danny Victor, Joe’s Crab Shack Tried Getting Rid of Tips. It Didn’t Last 
Long, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2016), https://nyti.ms/1Wsq31E [https://perma.cc/QP7S-8SKF]. 
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waitstaff at least the statutory minimum wage, and perhaps dissuade diners 
from leaving tips. In its place, the restaurant would impose a service charge 
presumably to cover lost tip income to the employees. Others may simply raise 
waiter pay to the minimum wage without discouraging customer tipping. By 
paying the minimum wage, the restaurant no longer claims a tip credit on its 
tax returns; rather, the employer claims a business deduction for wages paid. 
The underlying motive of the restaurateurs is also unclear.6 A close observer of 
tipping practices in the industry argues that tipping overcompensates waitstaff 
in high-end restaurants and owners may wish to recoup some of these revenues 
even if prices will have to be raised to partially compensate waitstaff for lost 
income.7 Another motive appears to be a desire to implement a more equitable 
sharing of tip income so it is not exclusively for the benefit of front-of-the-
house workers such as waitstaff—who typically come in contact with custom-
ers—but can also be shared with back-of-the-house employees such as the 
people in the kitchen—who do not. Federal and state laws presently constrain 
such tip-sharing arrangements.8 
But if the perceived evils are undue restrictions on tip-pooling, it is not 
clear how a ban on tipping solves the problem. Unless customer perception 
changes such that waitstaff would no longer receive supplemental income from 
tipping because customers believe the waiter is now being paid an adequate 
fixed salary, customers will still tip to some extent. The issue will still arise 
whether the tips go only to the waiter or whether they may be shared with oth-
er employees who contribute to the collective endeavor. 
Existing legal rules make it difficult for the employer to adopt what the 
employer believes to be the best tip-pooling arrangement for its employees. 
Under present federal law, if the employer wishes to receive a tip credit—to 
have some of the sums received by employees in tips count toward the statuto-
ry minimum wage—the sharing of tips is limited to employees “who customar-
                                                                                                                           
 6 See Patricia Cohen, Restaurants Say No to Tips, Yes to Higher Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 
2015, at A1. Various restaurateurs and managers offered many justifications for considering the elim-
ination of tipping including (1) the growth of the minimum wage, especially in particular states and 
localities, which forces ownership to give raises to workers who are already receiving amounts far in 
excess of the minimum wage in tip income; (2) avoiding the “confusing welter of federal, state and 
local regulations and tax laws” that govern tipping; (3) gaining the freedom “to better calibrate wages 
to reward employees based on the length of their service and the complexity of their jobs”; and (4) 
concern over “research showing that diners tend to tip black servers less and that the system can en-
courage sexual harassment of women.” Id.; see also Pete Wells, Tips Are Going Away at a Prominent 
Restaurant Group, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2015, at A24; Harriet Alexander, New Yorkers Bemused by 
New No-Tipping Policy in Michelin-Starred Manhattan Restaurant, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 22, 2015, 
1:48 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/12009247/To-tip-or-not-to-
tip-New-Yorkers-bemused-by-new-dining-diktat.html [https://perma.cc/38LE-7S6E]. 
 7 Lynn, supra note 5, at 152 (“[The] biggest reason for restaurateurs to replace tipping is that it 
takes revenue away from them in the form of lower prices and gives it to servers in the form of tip 
income that is excessively high compared to other restaurant employees.”). 
 8 See infra notes 40–45 and accompanying text. 
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ily and regularly receive tips.”9 Management-level employees, including team 
captains and maître d’s, are excluded, as are back-of-the-house staff such as the 
employees in the kitchen.10 
It remains unsettled, however, whether an employer that intends to pay all 
of its employees the statutory minimum wage, and thus will not be taking a tip 
credit, may institute a tip-pooling arrangement that allows participation by em-
ployees who do not “customarily and regularly” receive tips. The U.S. De-
partment of Labor (DOL), which enforces the federal Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), has, since 1989,11 taken the position that the restriction on who may 
participate in a tip pool holds whether or not the employer is claiming a tip 
credit with respect to the recipient of the tip income.12 But, in 2010, the Ninth 
Circuit held in Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc. that the FLSA tip-pooling limitation 
applies only where employers invoke the tip credit to pay their employees less 
than the statutory minimum wage.13 Despite this ruling, in April 2011, the DOL 
issued regulations reaffirming its tip-pooling restriction.14 The regulation pro-
vides in pertinent part: “[t]ips are the property of the employee whether or not 
the employer has taken a tip credit under section 3(m) of the FLSA.”15 In Feb-
ruary 2016, the Ninth Circuit held in Oregon Restaurant & Lodging Associa-
tion v. Perez that its decision in Cumbie did not bar the DOL’s 2011 regulation, 
and upheld that regulation as within the agency’s discretion.16 The Trump ad-
                                                                                                                           
 9 The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (2012) [hereinafter FLSA]; see The Tip 
Wage Credit, 29 C.F.R. § 531.59 (2017) (“[A]ll tips received by the tipped employee must be retained 
by the employee except for a valid tip pooling arrangement limited to employees who customarily and 
regularly receive tips . . . .”). On December 4, 2017, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) announced 
it would publish a notice of proposed rulemaking to change this regulation. See infra note 17. 
 10 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m)(2) (allowing tip-pooling only for employees who “customarily and 
regularly receive tips”); Id. § 531.59 (same). 
 11 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter on Tip Credits/Deductions from 
Wages (Dec. 26, 1973). The agency’s pre-1989 view was that restrictions on tip-pooling applied only 
where the employer sought to claim the tip credit. See id. 
 12 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter on Tip-Pooling (Oct. 26, 1989). 
Specifically, the letter provides that: 
Although section 3(m) concerns the circumstances in which a tip credit can be taken, it 
also provides guidance on the circumstances in which a requirement that employers 
contribute a portion of their tips to other employees would be an improper deduction 
from wages for purposes of compliance with section 6 of the Act. 
Id. The DOL reasoned that if a tip pool includes employees who do not customarily and regularly 
receive tips “the employee would, in effect, [be] contribut[ing] part of his or her property to the em-
ployer or to other persons for the benefit of the employer, with the result that the employee would not 
have received the full minimum wage ‘free and clear’ . . . .” Id. 
 13 596 F.3d 577, 583 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 14 29 C.F.R. §§ 531.52–.60 (2011); 76 Fed. Reg. 18,838–45, 18,855–56 (Apr. 5, 2011); see U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN NO. 2012-2: ENFORCEMENT OF 2011 TIP CREDIT 
REGULATIONS (Feb. 29, 2012). 
 15 29 C.F.R. § 531.52 (2017). 
 16 Or. Rest. & Lodging Ass’n v. Perez, 816 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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ministration DOL has now announced a proposed rulemaking seeking to revise 
its tip-pooling regulation.17 
Although we disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, for we do not see a 
statutory basis in the FLSA for restricting tip-pooling where the employer pays 
the full statutory minimum wage, this Article proceeds on the normative lev-
el.18 We present below the case for tipping and relatively unrestricted tip-
pooling among employees. Our argument is that tipping is a valuable economic 
practice that can benefit both employees and owners. Tipping helps to solve a 
principal-agent problem between management and workers. When customers 
tip based upon the quantity and quality of service, they provide an important 
feedback mechanism concerning employee performance in circumstances 
where the employer cannot readily monitor that performance. Tipping facili-
tates “buyer monitoring.”19 Tip income is related to the size of the overall bill, 
but it is also a function of customer satisfaction. Employees unhappy with their 
tips will improve their performance or change jobs.20 In addition, although this 
may not provide a complete public policy justification, in settings where cash 
tips prevail, tipping allows customers (and therefore, if indirectly, employers) 
to more cheaply reimburse employees for their services.21 Since cash tips are 
less likely to be taxed (or at least are likely to be under-reported), the actual 
benefit to employees is greater than the same amount in (taxable) income 
would be. In a sense, cash tips allow the customer to distribute income from 
the public purse to the direct provider of services. 
Our fundamental claim is that tip-pooling is a generally desirable practice 
because it promotes cooperation among employees towards achieving the goals 
                                                                                                                           
 17 On December 4, 2017, the U.S. DOL announced it would publish a notice of proposed rule 
making to change this regulation. See U.S. DOL, WHD NEWS RELEASE 12/04/2017; OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, RIN 1235-AA21, TIP REGULATIONS UNDER 
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (2017), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaView
Rule?pubId=201704&RIN=1235-AA21, [https://perma.cc/5VRY-BRYE]. For the DOL’s Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, see www.federalregister,giv/dcouments/2017/12/05/2017-25802. 
 18 See, e.g., Marlow v. New Food Guy, Inc., 861 F.3d 1157, 1162 (10th Cir. 2017) (disagreeing 
with the Ninth Circuit’s determination). 
 19 Robert J. Kwortnick, Jr. et al., Buyer Monitoring: A Means to Insure Personalized Service, 46 
J. MARKETING RES. 573, 574 (2009). 
 20 The empirical literature suggests, however, that tip income is not always related to customer 
service. See Michael Lynn, Tip Levels and Service: An Update, Extension, and Reconciliation, 44 
CORNELL HOTEL & REST. ADMIN. Q., no. 5–6, 2003, at 139, 141; Michael Lynn, Restaurant Tipping 
and Service Quality, 42 CORNELL HOTEL & REST. ADMIN. Q., no. 1, 2001, at 14, 16. Based on this 
literature, one commentator urges that tipping provides no monitoring, and hence no social benefits. 
See Yoram Margalioth, The Social Norm of Tipping, Its Correlation with Inequality, and Differences 
in Tax Treatment Across Countries, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 561, 581 (2010). 
 21 See Samuel Estreicher & Jonathan R. Nash, The Law and Economics of Tipping: The Laborer’s 
Perspective 1–2 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n Annual Meetings, Paper No. 54, 2004), http://law.bepress.
com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1068&context=alea [https://perma.cc/TYH4-2JA6]. 
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of the enterprise, and most legal restrictions on tip-pooling are ill-advised.22 
Serving customers is often a cooperative endeavor among several employees 
only some of whom deal directly with the customer. Tip-pooling arrangements 
provide a mechanism for employers to reward cooperation among employees. 
Legal restrictions on tip-pooling preclude employers from putting in place ar-
rangements which would further the shared objectives of all the employees. 
These restrictions also may fuel friction among employees, only some of whom 
are legally eligible to participate in tip-pooling. 
Not all restrictions on tip-pooling should be eliminated. Owners should be 
barred from appropriating tip income because this would be inconsistent with 
customer expectations.23 Customers give tips in the expectation that this in-
come will be distributed to non-owner staff. A clear legal rule enforces that 
expectation and would yield the maximum benefits of a tipping regime; any 
ambiguity would discourage tipping. The no-tipping rule operates, in effect, as 
a bonding device assuring customers that tips will go to the employees.24 
Moreover, the incentive effects of tipping apply to employees not owners. 
Ownership puts its capital at risk in running the business and enjoys the profit 
upside. As such, they already have a strong incentive to provide good service.25 
Thus, owners should have no claim to customers’ tips—monies that are de-
signed to reward non-management employees for providing quality service. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents doctrinal background. It 
discusses the laws governing tip-pooling, with an emphasis on relevant federal 
and state laws.26 Part II analyzes, from a law-and-economics perspective, how 
tip-pooling arrangements—both voluntary and mandatory—might arise, and 
what form they might take.27 Part III shows how governing law limits the abil-
ity of restaurateurs to put tip-pooling arrangements in place, and shapes the 
incentives of employees.28 It also analyzes the response of restaurants like the 
Union Square Hospitality Group that have barred all tipping. Part IV suggests 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
 23 The line should be drawn to bar non-employee owners and employee owners who have a con-
trolling interest by dint of their ownership share. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, EMPLOYMENT LAW 
§ 1.03 (AM. LAW. INST. 2015). 
 24 See Victor, supra note 5 (“Company research had found that 60 percent of the restaurants’ 
customers disliked the change in tipping . . . . They wanted to inspire good service with their tips and 
they didn’t trust management to pass on the money to its employees . . . .”). 
 25 It is at least in part for this reason that, even in establishments where tipping is otherwise cus-
tomary, the tipping norm does not generally extend to owners who are personally providing the ser-
vice. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts in Agency Arrangements: Lawyers, Real 
Estate Brokers, Underwriters, and Other Agents’ Rewards, 36 J.L. & ECON. 503, 532–33 n.55 (1993). 
 26 See infra notes 30–49 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 50–70 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
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revisions to existing law that would free up management’s freedom to utilize 
tip-pooling.29 
I. LEGAL TREATMENT OF TIP-POOLING 
In this Part, we provide an overview of the legal treatment of tip-pooling. 
Section A discusses governing federal law. Section B presents a summary of 
applicable state laws. 
A. Federal Law 
Before we turn to the specifics of federal regulation of tip-pooling, we 
discuss how and when federal law empowers employers to take advantage of 
the tip credit, and thus pay less than minimum wage to employees on the as-
sumption that tip income will bring the employees’ actual total wages up to—
and possibly beyond—the minimum wage. 
1. Tip Credit 
The tip credit is an exception to the federal minimum wage law. The 
FLSA30 establishes a national minimum wage,31 but sets out a modified standard 
for so-called “tipped employees”—employees “engaged in an occupation in 
which [they] customarily and regularly receive[] more than $30 a month in 
tips.”32 Although tipped employees must receive at least the minimum wage, 
they may receive a portion of their compensation in the form of tips rather than 
direct wages. Prior to 1966, employers could take a tip credit for up to fifty per-
cent of the statutory minimum wage.33 In 1996, Congress amended the law to 
remove the percentage limitation and tie the minimum wage obligation to a fixed 
amount.34 Current law sets the minimum non-tip compensation due tipped em-
ployees at “the cash wage required to be paid such an employee on August 20, 
1996,”35 i.e., $2.13.36 Thus, current law allows more than 70.6%, or $5.12, of the 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
 30 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012 & Supp. IV 2016). 
 31 See id. § 206(a)(1). Since 1997, the minimum wage has been set at $5.15 per hour. The FLSA 
establishes only a federal wage floor; it explicitly authorizes state and local governments to impose 
higher minimum wage requirements. See id. § 218(a). 
 32 Id. § 203(t). 
 33 See Susan N. Eisenberg & Jennifer T. Williams, Evolution of Wage Issues in the Restaurant 
Industry, 30 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 389, 391 (2015). 
 34 See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 2105(b), 110 Stat. 
1929. The minimum wage in effect from 1991 through October 1, 1996, was $4.25 per hour. Kilgore 
v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc., 160 F.3d 294, 297 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing the 1994 version of 29 
U.S.C. § 206(a)). Thus, employers had to provide $2.13 in minimum cash compensation to tipped 
employees. Myers v. Copper Cellar Corp., 192 F.3d 546, 548–49 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 35 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 
 36 Eisenberg & Williams, supra note 33, at 391–92. 
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current $7.25 federal hourly minimum wage to come in the form of tips.37 The 
amount of compensation an employer may provide to a tipped employee in the 
form of tips and have it count toward the employee’s minimum wage is called 
the tip credit. 
The FLSA imposes two requirements an employer must meet in order to 
take advantage of the tip credit with respect to an employee. First, the employ-
er must advise the employee of its intent to treat tips as satisfying part of the 
employer’s minimum wage obligation. Second, it must allow the employee to 
retain “all tips received by such employee.”38 
At first blush, one might read the statutory tip credit requirement—that 
the employer must allow the employee to retain “all tips received by such em-
ployee”—as foreclosing the possibility of tip-pooling where a tip credit is 
sought. The statute, however, expressly provides that it “shall not be construed 
to prohibit the pooling of tips among employees who customarily and regularly 
receive tips.”39 
2. Restrictions on Tip-Pooling 
The DOL and courts have interpreted the FLSA to allow tip-pooling both 
when voluntarily agreed to by the affected employees and as mandated by em-
ployers.40 In the agency’s view, participants in mandatory tipping pools must 
be employees “who customarily and regularly receive tips.”41 As mentioned, 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Id. 
 38 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (2012). 
 39 Id. 
 40 See, e.g., Kilgore, 160 F.3d at 303–04 (concluding that the FLSA “expressly permits the ‘pool-
ing of tips’ and does not bar employers from requiring tip pooling”). The DOL has taken the position 
that the size of any mandatory tipping pool must be “customary and reasonable” and that such a re-
quirement is satisfied if employees retain at least fifteen percent of their tips. Id. at 302–03 (referring 
to DOL opinion letters); LES A. SCHNEIDER & J. LARRY STINE, WAGE AND HOUR LAW: COMPLIANCE 
AND PRACTICE § 7:9 (2017). But the Sixth Circuit in Kilgore rejected this interpretation as supported 
neither by the language of the statute or regulations. See 160 F.3d at 302–04 (holding that the only 
valid restriction on mandatory tipping pools is that tipped employees’ wages remain at or above the 
applicable minimum wage). 
 41 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #15A: OWNERSHIP OF TIPS UN-
DER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (rev. Dec. 2016), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/
compliance/whdfs15a.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK7G-E4DH] (advising that all tips received by the 
tipped employee are to be retained by the employee except for valid tip-pooling arrangements limited 
to employees who “customarily and regularly receive tips”). Compare Kilgore, 160 F.3d at 301–02 
(holding that restaurant hosts at Outback Steakhouses “work in an occupation that customarily and 
regularly receives tips” and, in doing so, contrasting hosts with “restaurant employees like dishwash-
ers, cooks, or off-hour employees like an overnight janitor who do not directly relate with customers 
at all”), with Myers v. Copper Cellar Corp., 192 F.3d 546, 550–51 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Because [Copper 
Cellar] salad preparers did not have any direct intercourse with diners, worked entirely outside the 
view of restaurant patrons, and solely performed duties traditionally classified as food preparation or 
kitchen support work, they could not validly be categorized as ‘tipped employees’ under section 
203(m)” and, therefore, could not legally be included in a mandatory tipping pool.). 
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there is currently a dispute as to whether (1) this bar applies only when em-
ployers invoke the tip credit, as some courts have recently held;42 or (2) this 
bar is absolute, as DOL regulations maintain.43 It should be noted that tipped 
employees enjoy more latitude in crafting voluntary tip-pooling arrangements 
than employers have in mandating them.44 States may further restrict employ-
er-mandated tip-pooling, as we discuss below.45 
B. State Law 
States are free to supplement federal limits on tip-pooling. A few states 
ban mandatory tip-pooling altogether,46 although voluntary tip-sharing remains 
permissible.47 Other states allow mandatory tip-pooling, but restrict which 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See, e.g., supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 43 See 29 C.F.R. § 531.52 (2017). 
 44 See SCHNEIDER & STINE, supra note 40 (“Despite the[] requirements for involuntary pooling 
arrangements imposed by [an] employer, employees may enter pooling arrangements with terms 
which do not conform to these rules if the contributing employees mutually agree to such terms.”). 
 45 See Jameson v. Five Fleet Rest., Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 771, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“Be-
cause [California law] imposes prohibitions on tip-pooling not contained in the FLSA . . . federal 
authorities . . . are inapplicable.”). “Under [California law], tip-pooling is only permitted among em-
ployees who are neither employers nor agents . . . .” Id. Some states have statutes that expressly pro-
hibit employer-mandated tip-pooling. See Walter John Wessels, Minimum Wages and Tipped Servers, 
35 ECON. INQUIRY 334, 336 (1997). Minnesota, for example, prohibits employer-mandated tip-
pooling: 
No employer may require an employee to contribute or share a gratuity received by the 
employee with the employer or other employees or to contribute any or all of the gratui-
ty to a fund or pool operated for the benefit of the employer or employees. This section 
does not prevent an employee from voluntarily and individually sharing gratuities with 
other employees. The agreement to share gratuities must be made by the employees 
without employer coercion or participation . . . . 
MINN. STAT. § 177.24(3) (2017). Other states are more permissive of mandated tip-pooling. Compare 
Matter of Wage & Hour Violations of Holly Inn, Inc., 386 N.W.2d 385, 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) 
(holding that Minnesota “statutes indicate that mandatory tip sharing is not allowed”), with Leighton 
v. Old Heidelberg, Ltd., 268 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649–53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that California law 
does preclude employer-mandated tip-pooling), Fraser v. Pears Co., 16 Mass. L. Rptr. 255, 255 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. 2003) (finding the same result under Massachusetts law), Wynn Las Vegas, L.L.C. v. Bal-
donado, 311 P.3d 1179, 1182 (Nev. 2013) (en banc) (holding that Nevada laws permit employer-
mandated tip-pooling where are all tips are distributed to employees), and Alford v. Harolds Club, 
669 P.2d 721, 723–24 (Nev. 1983) (finding the same result under Nevada law). 
 46 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.065(1) (West 2017) (“No employer shall require an employ-
ee to remit to the employer any gratuity, or any portion thereof, except for the purpose of withholding 
amounts required by federal or state law.”); id. § 337.065(3) (“No employer shall require an employee 
to participate in a tip pool whereby the employee is required to remit to the pool any gratuity, or any 
portion thereof, for distribution among employees of the employer.”). 
 47 E.g., id. § 337.065(4) (“Employees may voluntarily enter into an agreement to divide gratuities 
among themselves. The employer may inform the employees of the existence of a voluntary pool and 
the customary tipping arrangements of the employees at the establishment.”). 
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workers may participate in such arrangements.48 Some states exclude mandato-
ry service charges from treatment as gratuities.49 
II. THE INCENTIVES UNDERLYING TIP-POOLING 
We consider restaurant tip-pooling under two hypothetical circumstanc-
es.50 First, we consider the setting where the waitstaff themselves decide 
whether or not to engage in tip-pooling. Then we consider the scenario in 
which management decides to impose tip-pooling. Our discussion centers on 
the notion that, whether management mandates tip-pooling or not, the provi-
sion of services to restaurant customers is—or at least generally should be—a 
cooperative endeavor among numerous employees, and the pooling of tips 
provides a means of rewarding such cooperation. 
A. Voluntary Tip-Pooling 
If management does not mandate tip-pooling, then the waitstaff themselves 
may decide whether and, if so, with whom, and to what extent to pool tips. In 
accordance with standard economic assumptions, we posit as a general matter 
that in making these decisions waiters seek to maximize their own profits.51 Un-
der these conditions, we can view the waitstaff at a restaurant as private business 
people independently providing services to restaurant customers. To be sure, the 
waitstaff do not compete for individual customers as do, for example, competing 
restaurants. Rather, the waitstaff serve the customers who choose to patronize 
the restaurant at which the waitstaff work. Still, we can view each waiter as pur-
chasing food from the restaurant kitchen, which they then resell to the customers 
seated as their respective tables. The waiter enjoys the profits (in the form of 
                                                                                                                           
 48 E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 351 (West 2017). Specifically, the California labor code provides that: 
No employer or agent shall collect, take, or receive any gratuity or a part thereof that is 
paid, given to, or left for an employee by a patron, or deduct any amount from wages 
due an employee on account of a gratuity, or require an employee to credit the amount, 
or any part thereof, of a gratuity against and as a part of the wages due the employee 
from the employer. 
Id. (emphasis added); Jameson, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 776 (interpreting § 351 to preclude not only “em-
ployers” from participating in mandatory tip pools, but also employers’ “agents”). 
 49 See Searle v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231, 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“Because 
the service charge is mandatory and because the hotel is free to do with the charge as it pleases, the 
service charge is simply not a gratuity which is subject to the discretion of the individual patron.”). 
 50 See generally Estreicher & Nash, supra note 21, at 15–23 (comparing and contrasting volun-
tary and mandatory tip-pooling arrangements). 
 51 But see Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 207 
(2001) (“[W]orkers are like most people. They behave like homo sapiens, not like homo economi-
cus.”). 
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tips),52 and decides how to structure restaurant service so as to maximize those 
profits.53 
1. Degrees of Cooperation 
To begin, the waitstaff must decide how much they will cooperate. Saul 
Levmore, former Dean of the University of Chicago Law School, has offered a 
framework for determining why firms cooperate with each other under competi-
tive conditions.54 First, he identifies different degrees of cooperation: explicit 
cooperation and varying degrees of implicit cooperation, and non-cooperation. 
He delineates them in the context of two competing firms that purchase like 
goods on an ongoing basis.55 Under the model of explicit cooperation, the two 
competitors might engage in joint venture-like behavior and agree to own and 
operate a factory from which they both will purchase output.56 Implicit coopera-
tion arises if the two firms purchase supplies from the same factory, with neither 
of the competitors having an ownership interest in the factory.57 Stronger implic-
it cooperation exists if the factory supplies goods to both competitors but is 
owned by one of the competitors.58 Under strict non-cooperation, firms “may 
refuse to deal with suppliers who deal at all with competitor firms.”59 A less 
strict form of non-cooperation envisions firms that “decline to buy components 
from suppliers who sell identical components to competitors.”60 
Levmore’s taxonomy of cooperation can be adapted to the restaurant set-
ting. There is a minimal level of cooperation at a restaurant, insofar as the 
waitstaff have, at a minimum, agreed to work at the same restaurant and offer 
the same food prepared by the same chefs. To this extent, then, the waitstaff 
have agreed to cooperate implicitly. Beyond that, the waitstaff remain free to 
choose a level of cooperation. 
An initial decision is whether the waitstaff will agree to engage in what 
we refer to as “explicit cooperation”—pooling of tips among all waitstaff. In 
the economic language of firm structure, this is a decision of whether or not to 
integrate horizontally. If the waitstaff agree to cooperate explicitly, then a sub-
sidiary decision arises—whether or not to pool tips beyond fellow waitstaff 
                                                                                                                           
 52 Cf. Wessels, supra note 45, at 334–35 (analogizing “tipping to profit sharing”). 
 53 We discuss below the question of how waitstaff might choose whether, and the extent to which, 
to pool tips. See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 54 See generally Saul Levmore, Competition and Cooperation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 216, 216 (1998). 
 55 Id. at 217–18. 
 56 Id. at 218. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Levmore describes this option as lying between the first two insofar as “[t]he trading between 
competitors is now explicit although the investment in the factory was implicitly cooperative.” Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
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with other restaurant workers, such as the busstaff. Table 161 reflects these 
choices. 
 
If the waitstaff decide not to pool tips, then, in effect, they will be in 
competition. At this point, they must decide the degree to which they will im-
plicitly cooperate with one another.62 First, they might decide simply to share 
(without delineation) the support staff provided by the restaurant. Under this 
scenario, the waitstaff would not pool tips with other restaurant staff, and 
would simply use their services as needed. 
A second, less cooperative, option is to have individual members of the 
waitstaff entice restaurant support staff to provide more (better or faster) service 
to them by tipping the support staff as they provide services or at the end of each 
shift. By this, we do not envision a formal tip-pooling arrangement between 
waitstaff and support staff; rather, waitstaff would provide tips on an ad hoc ba-
sis as they see fit. This notion may be of greater applicability with respect to cer-
tain support staff services than others. For example, the notion of a waiter tip-
ping a busboy for prompt service on an individual basis might be difficult in 
practice, but waitstaff at some restaurants do indeed tip the individuals manning 
the beverage or dessert bars for faster service.63 Under this scenario, the waitstaff 
are still using services provided by the restaurant, but they are openly competing 
with one another for priority with respect to those services. 
A third, even less cooperative, option is for the waitstaff to join with par-
ticular support staff and form “service teams” that share tips.64 In the economic 
language of firms, this scenario is a form of vertical integration. For example, 
each waiter might choose their own busperson; each team of waiter and bus-
person would then serve only their own customers, and would pool tips ob-
tained from those customers. Under this scenario—minimal cooperation—the 
waitstaff cooperate internally only with respect to the provision of foods pre-
pared by the restaurant. 
                                                                                                                           
 61 This Table is permanently available at 
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/58-6/estreicher-
nash-graphics-A1b.pdf. 
 62 As noted above, there is a minimal level of implicit cooperation, so that non-cooperation is not 
an option. 
 63 Interview with Anonymous Former Dessert Maker at a New York City restaurant, in Tanners-
ville, Pa. (Aug. 3, 2003). 
 64 Estreicher & Nash, supra note 21, at 17. 
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Figure 165 presents the varying degrees of cooperation, and the resulting 
staff structures. 
 
There is a full spectrum of cooperation possibilities beyond the four dis-
tinct options presented in Figure 1. For example, under minimal cooperation, it 
is possible that waitstaff will offer service to patrons sitting at tables outside 
their “station” if specifically requested. It is also possible they will absolutely 
refuse to serve tables outside their station. 
2. Choosing the Level of Cooperation 
Having set out possible degrees of cooperation in which waitstaff might 
engage, we turn to the question of how waitstaff choose a level of cooperation. 
As an initial matter, we think that once a system of tip-pooling or no tip-
pooling is in place, that system is likely to remain in place (whether for reasons 
of inertia or otherwise). But, there are circumstances where employees will opt 
for tip-pooling. First, the possibility that management might mandate tip-
pooling might make voluntary tip-pooling more likely. To the extent manage-
ment is permitted by law to mandate tip-pooling, the shadow of management 
compulsion may convince waitstaff simply to come up with an agreement on 
their own, which they may prefer to whatever arrangement management might 
impose. 
Second, it may be in the economic self-interest of the waitstaff to engage 
in some tip-pooling entirely on their own, even if management has not man-
dated the practice. For example, the waitstaff might believe tip-pooling would 
lead to uniformly better service, which would, in turn, lead to increased pat-
ronage and increased tipping, such that all (or virtually all) members of the 
waitstaff would receive higher pay under a tip-pooling regime. 
Third, tip-pooling also addresses employee concerns over horizontal equi-
ty66—whether similarly-situated employees are being compensated in a rela-
                                                                                                                           
 65 This Figure is permanently available at 
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/58-6/estreicher-
nash-graphics-A1b.pdf. 
2018] The Case for Tip-Pooling 15 
tively uniform manner. Employees tend to evaluate satisfaction with their 
compensation based more upon how their salaries match up with other work-
ers’ salaries, than on their salaries’ absolute magnitude.67 Tip-pooling helps 
ensure that the happenstance of serving a particular customer does not mean 
significant differences in compensation, and that all employees who engage in 
the joint venture of serving customers are appropriately compensated for the 
contribution they make to the overall enterprise. Tip-pooling involves a shift of 
resources from the waitstaff to the kitchen personnel, which may also compen-
sate for differential status that otherwise might hamper cooperation. 
B. Mandatory Tip-Pooling 
As noted above, tip-pooling is generally lawful although the class of em-
ployee recipients may be limited by law. We explore now the circumstances un-
der which management is likely to require tip-pooling. 
At the outset, we assume, as before, that economic self-interest domin-
ates. Accordingly, we assume management seeks to maximize restaurant prof-
its.68 That means management will implement tip-pooling where such an ar-
rangement will lead to an increase in restaurant profits. It may seem odd to 
some that management would need to introduce market-like economic incen-
tives within a firm. But the fact remains that restaurant employees are engaged 
in an endeavor that works best under cooperation among waitstaff, and the 
employer may wish to introduce incentives to ensure that cooperation indeed 
occurs. 
The time horizon over which profits are to be maximized and the type of 
restaurant involved will affect management’s decision. For example, manage-
ment may simply want to maximize customer turnover so as to increase short-
term profits. In that case, management’s choice as to tip-pooling will turn on 
whether the resulting service structure will generate quicker turnover. 
Management may be concerned with the perceived quality of service, in-
sofar as it affects repeat business and profits over the longer term. Manage-
ment may conclude that service is friendlier and more conducive to customer 
satisfaction in a setting where waitstaff get along well, and may determine that 
tip-pooling fosters that goal. Certainly, in cases where destructive competitive 
tipping might occur—that is, tipping designed to encourage waitstaff to pro-
                                                                                                                           
 66 See generally Joseph J. Cordes, Horizontal Equity, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND 
TAX POLICY 195–96 (Joseph J. Cordes et al., eds., 1999) (explaining the fairness principle that indi-
viduals in similar socio-economic situations should be taxed equally). 
 67 See, e.g., Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 348–49 (2001). 
 68 If management and ownership are identical, then the incentive is clear. If management is dis-
tinct from ownership, then presumably ownership will reward management for increases in profits, 
and thus profit-maximization is incentivized. 
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vide service to higher tippers to the exclusion of lower tippers— management 
may find it especially appropriate to impose tip-pooling.69 
Management also may be seeking to maximize profits by minimizing 
cash salary payments to staff. Recall that tips can be used to offset the cash 
minimum wage management must pay workers. Thus, if a restaurant pays 
more of its workers below the generally applicable minimum wage, it may in-
voke tip-pooling as a means of distributing tips over a greater set of employ-
ees. 
Management’s business plan may also rely on retaining employees over 
the long term. One aspect of that strategy might be a focus on increasing the 
attractiveness of lower-tier positions. Tip-pooling provides a mechanism for 
some improvement in compensation from relatively higher-paid tipped em-
ployees to relatively lower-paid non-tipped employees.70 
As in the case of voluntary tip-pooling, sometimes concerns that are not 
strictly economic might influence management’s decision to mandate tip-
pooling, such as a desire to promote horizontal equity among similarly-situated 
employees. On the other hand, management might be less inclined to imple-
ment tip-pooling where waitstaff have been at the position for a considerable 
period of time; mandating tip-pooling in such circumstances may upset en-
trenched expectations as to compensation. 
III. THE MISMATCH BETWEEN BANS ON TIPPING AND THE OBJECTIVE OF 
MINIMIZING RESTRICTIONS ON TIP-POOLING 
If the object of a ban on tipping is to shift compensation from relatively 
higher-paid tipped employees to the relatively lower-paid back-of-the-house 
staff, the ban is likely to be less direct and less efficient way to promote the 
stated objective than seeking a relaxation of existing legal constraints on tip-
sharing 
As discussed earlier, some restaurants are considering banning tipping as 
a means of shifting more income to back-of-the-house employees.71 This is a 
doubtful way to promote a more egalitarian distribution of tip income among 
employees. If tipping is banned, there is no tip-pooling; there is only manage-
ment determination of compensation. 
We are sympathetic to the frustration of restaurants that are unable, be-
cause of legal impediments, to include back-of-the-house employees in tip 
                                                                                                                           
 69 Cf. Saul Levmore, Norms as Supplements, 86 VA. L. REV. 1989, 1994 n.7 (2000) (arguing that 
tipping may influence employees towards “collusion against the employer,” such as offering patrons 
complementary drinks—at the expense of the employer—in order to earn a larger tip). 
 70 It may also have a redistributive effect favoring higher-paid employees if some managerial 
employees are, contrary to federal law, permitted to participate in the pool. 
 71 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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pools. Although owners are perfectly free to discourage tipping, we do not be-
lieve it is generally in their interest to do so. 
A ban on tipping is at counter-purposes with management’s objective to 
promote quality service to customers.72 The institution of tipping helps solve a 
key principal-agent problem. The principal (management) is in a poor position to 
monitor the provision of services to customers; that, in turn, invites agents (em-
ployees) to shirk in their provision of services. Tipping mitigates the principal-
agent problem by empowering customers—who can monitor the provision of 
services—to reward good service. The elimination of tipping reinstates restaura-
teurs’ principal-agent problem at full bore. 
The elimination of tipping leaves in place a substantial principal-agent 
problem. Unsolved, it is likely to lead to customers having to endure worse 
service than at other establishments that retain tipping. Additionally, it is de-
batable whether customers—who are used to having the freedom to tip in order 
to induce better service—will agree to pay higher prices for food in lieu of the 
ability to compensate for better service.73 
IV. THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF MOST RESTRICTIONS ON TIP-POOLING 
Existing law puts severe limits on tip-pooling. Supervisory employees, 
such as the headwaiter, may not participate in tip pools. Back-of-the-house 
employees are also ineligible to participate in employer-mandated tip pools. 
States are also free to bar employer-mandated tip-pooling altogether. We agree 
that ownership-level employees should be barred from tip-pooling arrange-
ments, but employers should generally be free to mandate tip pools and to in-
clude certain supervisory employees, like the maître d’ and headwaiter, and 
back-of-the-house employees in those pools, who are directly involved in the 
provision of service to the customer74 
                                                                                                                           
 72 One commentator questions whether tipping vel non affects quality of service. Margalioth, 
supra note 20, at 580. We agree that the average size of tips is more a function of the size of the bill 
than anything else. But, in our view, the presence of tipping raises the level of quality. It is widely 
agreed that, in countries where tipping is not customary, such as France, the quality of service is con-
siderably lower than in the United States. 
 73 See, e.g., Kathryn Vasel, Joe’s Crab Shack Backs Away from No-Tipping Policy, CNN MONEY 
(May 12, 2016, 4:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/12/pf/joes-crab-shack-ends-no-tipping-
policy/ [https://perma.cc/S9H4-3JPU] (noting that the restaurant chain was abandoning its no-tipping 
policy less than a year after it was implemented, based on objections from customers and staff, and 
loss of business and employees). 
 74 Another defensible line—and one that would preclude more individuals from sharing in tip 
pools—would bar (in addition to owners) executive-level employees. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 541.100 (2017). 
An “employee employed in a bona fide executive capacity” is an employee (1) who is paid a rate of 
no less than $455 per week; (2) “[w]hose primary duty is” to manage the business—or a “department 
or subdivision thereof”—in which they are employed; (3) “[w]ho customarily and regularly directs the 
work of two or more other employees”; and (4) “[w]ho has the authority to hire or fire other employ-
ees,” or whose input regarding employee “hiring, firing, advancement, promotion,” etc. has “particular 
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Consider initially that the delivery of services in this context is a coopera-
tive endeavor. No single employee can provide the full extent of service re-
quired by the customer. Yet, while customers are relatively well-positioned to 
monitor front-of-the-house employees, they are not in a good position to moni-
tor back-of-the-house employees. After all, customers rarely come in contact 
with back-of-the-house employees, and are rarely able to observe clearly the 
quality of the services they render. But, front-of-the-house employees are well-
positioned to monitor the quality of services back-of-the-house employees ren-
der. 
The foregoing provides a sound basis for front-of-the-house employees to 
voluntarily enter tip-pooling arrangements that include back-of-the-house em-
ployees. But, our argument here goes further: we posit that owners should be 
permitted to mandate such arrangements. We offer three justifications for this 
conclusion. 
First, employees are often not well-positioned to decide upon or imple-
ment tip-pooling arrangements. Even employees who might otherwise be in-
clined to share tips face strong inertial forces without the coordinating role of 
management. Moreover, any tendency for employees acting on their own to 
favor certain co-workers over others in the tip pool would create friction 
among employees that could undermine the enterprise as a whole.75 Manage-
ment, because it is responsible for the welfare of the enterprise as a whole, is 
likely to avoid such strains. 
Second, owners have put their capital at risk. As such, it makes sense to 
empower them to create incentives in order to generate the cooperative ar-
rangements they believe will enhance their profits. 
Third, limits on tip-pooling restrict management’s ability to attract and re-
tain the best employees.76 
                                                                                                                           
weight.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a distinction makes sense, insofar as executive-
level employees are presumably subject to adequate monitoring by ownership even without tips. In 
addition, a bar against executive-level employees sharing in tips would arguably accord with employ-
ee and customer expectations. 
 75 See Leighton v. Old Heidelberg, Ltd., 268 Cal. Rptr. 647, 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding 
that equitable tip sharing is essential to creating a collaborative and orderly employment environ-
ment). 
 76 The court in Leighton endorsed such an approach by holding that: 
To permit a waitress to determine what if anything she should share with the busboy 
based upon what she deems to be the worth of his service can only lead to the . . . loss 
of good employees . . . and a disruption in the kind of service the public has a right to 
expect. An employer must be able to exercise control over his business to . . . provide 
good service to the public. 
Id.; see also Jeff Gordinier, No Tipping, the Danny Meyer Way, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2015, at D8 
(noting that a Union Square Hospitality Group restaurant’s executive chef “is enthusiastic about the 
change because it means he will be able to pay his cooks something closer to a living wage, and retain 
talent”); Alexander, supra note 6 (noting that the decision by Danny Meyer to increase menu prices by 
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We are especially dubious of the DOL’s position (which it is now reconsid-
ering)77 that the FLSA’s limitations on mandatory tip-pooling apply even when 
the employer does not seek to benefit from the tip credit. Employees who are 
subject to the tip credit earn less than the ordinary minimum wage in direct com-
pensation; insofar as they rely on tips to bring their income up to the standard 
minimum wage, some restrictions on tip-pooling are warranted to ensure com-
pliance with the minimum wage. But, these restrictions make little sense where 
employees with customary tips are compensated well above the minimum wage, 
and no sense where the employer does not claim the tip credit at all. Indeed, 
there is evidence the restaurant industry is highly-competitive.78 If so, then im-
posing restrictions on tip-pooling where the tip credit is invoked may be war-
ranted, but imposing those restrictions where the tip credit is not invoked re-
quires reexamination. 
CONCLUSION 
Tip-pooling promotes the objectives of ownership—it is a form of varia-
ble pay,79 compensating employees according to the quality of their services. 
Tip-pooling is also a form of profit sharing—both in the sense that employees 
share tips among themselves and in the sense that tipping allows workers to 
share (if indirectly) in a restaurant’s profits. The law should not generally re-
strict this hybrid form of compensation, other than to make sure owners are not 
diverting tips to themselves, and tipped employees are at least paid the statuto-
ry minimum wage once tips are counted. 
                                                                                                                           
twenty percent “means [that] he is now able to pay his chefs a better salary and [he] has already seen a 
spike in applications from talented cooks”); Wells, supra note 6 (noting that a Union Square Hospital-
ity Group chef “has been agitating for higher pay to attract skilled cooks”). 
 77 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 78 See John E. Anderson & Örn B. Bodvarsson, Do Higher Tipped Wages Boost Server Pay?, 12 
APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 391, 391 (2005) (finding little evidence of a premium to servers in states 
with more generous minimum wages); Alex Tabarrok, The Problem of Contingent Fees for Waiters, 8 
GREEN BAG 2D 377, 379 (2005) (arguing that, even though the tip percentage does not vary with meal 
price, the fact that the total tip amount does vary with the meal price strongly suggests that the market 
for servers is highly competitive). But see NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, MINIMUM WAGE BASICS: 
OVERVIEW OF THE TIPPED MINIMUM WAGE 3 (2015) (presenting data showing that many workers, 
and in particular many servers, earn less than the standard minimum wage in direct employer compen-
sation); Donald G. Schmitt, Tips: The Mainstay of Many Hotel Workers’ Pay, MONTHLY LAB. REV., 
July 1985, at 50, 51 (providing data that shows the extent to which tip income constitutes total wages 
varies by industry). 
 79 See generally MARTIN L. WEITZMAN, THE SHARE ECONOMY: CONQUERING STAGFLATION 
(1984) (endorsing the general desirability of performance-based compensation). 
  
 
